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Edit ndaal-sa-2026-417
Document Metadata
Tracking ID *
Title *
Category *
Security Advisory
VEX
Informational Advisory
Status *
draft
interim
final
Document Version *
TLP 2.0 *
TLP:CLEAR
TLP:GREEN
TLP:AMBER
TLP:AMBER+STRICT
TLP:RED
Verschlusssache
VS-NfD (VS-NUR FÜR DEN DIENSTGEBRAUCH)
VS-Vertr. (VS-VERTRAULICH)
Geh. (GEHEIM)
Str. Geh. (STRENG GEHEIM)
NATO
NR (NATO RESTRICTED)
NC (NATO CONFIDENTIAL)
NS (NATO SECRET)
CTS (COSMIC TOP SECRET)
Initial Release Date *
Current Release Date *
Summary *
The encryption-at-rest cipher held exactly one key and the enc:v1:/ENC1 envelope records no key identity, so there was no supported way to rotate the key. An operator who pointed --encryption-key-file at a new key turned every previously sealed annotation body and image asset into unreadable data, and did so silently: an unopenable value is returned verbatim, which is byte-for-byte indistinguishable from a note that was always stored as plaintext.
Publisher
Name *
Namespace *
Category *
vendor
discoverer
coordinator
user
translator
other
Contact details
Affected Product
Vendor *
Product Name *
Product ID *
Product Status *
known_affected
known_not_affected
fixed
under_investigation
Vulnerability
Required for Security Advisories, optional for Informational / VEX.
CVE ID
Vulnerability Title
Vulnerability Description
Cipher (src/crypto.rs) wrapped a single XChaCha20-Poly1305 key. open_text/open_blob attempt one decryption and, on failure, fall back to returning the stored value unchanged -- the deliberate design that lets plaintext and sealed rows coexist without a migration. With one key that fallback is benign; the moment the key changes it becomes a silent data-loss path, because the fallback cannot distinguish 'sealed with a key I do not hold' from 'never sealed at all'. No error is raised, no log line is emitted, and the UI renders the base64 ciphertext as if it were the note's text. The security consequence is key lifecycle: because rotation was not possible, an operator who suspected the data key had leaked had no way to retire it -- the compromised key remained the only key that could read the store, indefinitely. There is no attacker in this issue and no remote trigger: it is reached by a legitimate administrative action on the host, which is why the vector is AV:L/PR:H with no user interaction and the impact is availability-only. Confidentiality and integrity are unaffected -- the ciphertext is intact and remains readable with the original key. Mapped to CWE-392 because the observable defect is the unreported failure; the underlying gap is key management (CWE-320 is the matching category, which CWE guidance does not permit as a mapping target). Threat model C-D1, which the project itself rated medium for Confidential-tier stores.
CWE ID
CWE Name
CVSS v3.1
Base Score (0.0 – 10.0)
Severity
—
NONE
LOW
MEDIUM
HIGH
CRITICAL
CVSS v3.1 Vector
CVSS v4.0
Base Score (0.0 – 10.0)
Severity
—
NONE
LOW
MEDIUM
HIGH
CRITICAL
CVSS v4.0 Vector
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